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The International Criminal Court (ICC) has
brought about fundamental changes in in-
ternational law, since in large parts of the
world it has closed the „impunity gap”. For
all too long the international community
has turned a blind eye to the most horrific
atrocities and allowed those responsible for
such crimes to escape punishment by invo-
king state immunity. The main purpose of
the Rome Statute and the ICC is to provide
the international community with the ne-
cessary instruments to close this gap and
deter potential perpetrators. To achieve this
objective, however, the Rome Statute will in
the long run need to gain universal accep-
tance. Europe is confident this will eventu-
ally happen, as there is already broad agree-
ment on the need to end impunity and disa-
greement only on how best this can be
achieved. 
2. 
To date the Rome Statute (RS) has been si-
gned by 139 and ratified by 92 countries.
The States Parties include all EU Member
States and the 10 countries acceding to the
European Union on 1 May 2004 with the
exception of the Czech Republic1, as well as
Canada, Australia, New Zealand and many
African and Latin American countries. The
Statute came into force after only 4 years,
considerably earlier than expected2 China,
Russia and Japan are still considering whe-
ther to accede. A number of previously hesi-
tant Arab countries appear to be moving to-
wards a more positive stance, judging by the
positions adopted at a recent conference on
„Democracy, Human Rights and the Role of
the International Criminal Court” organized
by the Government of the Republic of
Yemen in Sana'a from 10 to 12 January
2004. 
Warsaw 2004
I .  THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT IS A REALITY
1 Since ratification requires an amendment to the constitution, the process has not yet been completed.
2 By comparison, it took twelve years (1982-1994) for the Convention on the Law of the Sea to enter into force
with the same minimum number of ratifications (60).


























3. THE ICC WILL BE FULLY
OPERATIONAL 
– AS FAR AS THE CORE
FUNCTIONS OF ALL 
FOUR ORGANS ARE 
CONCERNED 
– AS OF APRIL 2004: 
Judges: The 18 judges representing the
world's principal legal systems were elec-
ted in February 2003 and sworn in in
March 2003. The judges are normally
elected for a nine-year term. Art. 36 (9)
(b) RS, stipulates, however, that at the
first election one third of the judges elec-
ted shall be selected by lot to serve for
a term of three years, one third of the jud-
ges elected shall be selected by lot to se-
rve for a term of six years and the remain-
der shall serve a term of nine years. A jud-
ge who is selected to serve for a term of
three years is eligible for re-election for
a full term. Eleven of the judges have pre-
viously worked as judges, prosecutors, ad-
vocates or in a similar capacity and seven
have a background in international huma-
nitarian law and the law of human rights.
Seven of the judges are women. Unfortu-
nately, there is only one judge from Cen-
tral Europe, Ms Anita Usacka (Latvia).
Judges are assigned to one of the Court's
three divisions – the Pre-Trial Division,
the Trial Division and the Appeals Divi-
sion – and may, with the exception of Ap-
peals Division judges, sit on chambers3.
Thirteen judges are present in The Hague,
as the investigation of the first situation
requires not only the presence of judges
in the Pre-Trial Chamber but also of
a chamber in the Appeals Division, since
many decisions of the Pre-Trial Chamber
are subject to appeal. 
The Presidency consists of three judges,
who represent the ICC in its ex-ternal re-
lations and oversee the Court's day-to-day
administration, which is the responsibi-
lity of the Registrar. In addition, they
each preside over one of the three 
Court's Divisions. 
The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) en-
joys a certain degree of independence4, 
as far as its core function is concerned.
However, when it comes to the formal
opening of investigations and indict-
ments, key decisions may be reviewed by
the Pre-Trial Chamber. The Chief Prosecu-
tor is Luis Moreno Ocampo and the De-
puty Prosecutor Serge Brammertz, who
will be in charge of investigations. A for-
mer high-ranking US Federal Prosecutor
has joined the OTP as senior prosecutor
in its Trial Division. 
The Registry provides the services requ-
ired to support the work of the Court (ge-
neral services and administration, transla-
tion and interpretation, extensive IT-ba-
sed registration services, security). The
Registrar, Bruno Cathala, is also respon-
sible for liaising with defense counsel
and providing support services for wit-
nesses as well as victims and their repre-
sentatives. 
By March 2004 some 170 out of 375 bud-
geted posts for 2004 had been filled. All the
staff required to start proper investigations
will shortly be in place. In order to keep the
Court lean and efficient and ensure costs 
3 The functions of the Pre-Trial Division may also be carried out by a judge sitting alone (Art. 57 (2) (b) RS).
4 That goes also for the recruitment of OTP staff, although it is still bound by the staff rules and regulations
applicable to all Court staff.


























remain under control, great care is taken
with recruitment5. Cost efficiency was one
of the key considerations in drafting the 
Court Rules, which will be adopted by the
judges sitting in plenary session in May
2004. They represent a well-balanced mix
of common law and civil law traditions6. 
The ICC occupies premises in The Hague
provided free of charge by the Netherlands
as host country. Work is in progress to
adapt the building to its new functions and
two to three courtrooms are being added,
one of which is already operational. 
4.
The ICC is an independent international
organization in its own right that operates
under the authority of the Assembly of Sta-
tes Parties. As a rule the Assembly meets
once a year to approve the budget, adopt
important legal instruments implementing
the RS and elect the Court's top personnel7.
However, for reasons not only connected
with its history, the ICC may also be viewed
as an offshoot of the United Nations: 
The Diplomatic Conference on the Esta-
blishment of a Permanent International
Criminal Court was convened under
a General Assembly Resolution. This set
in train the process that resulted in the
Rome Statute, which was adopted on 17
July 1998 after five weeks of arduous ne-
gotiation and welcomed by the General
Assembly on several occasions. 
The RS provides for the Security Council
to refer situations to the ICC under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Art. 13
(b) RS); it may also request the Court to
interrupt investigations for up to 12
months (Art. 16 RS) if, in a given situa-
tion, this would benefit the peace pro-
cess, for example; such a request is rene-
wable. 
The RS provides for the investigation and
indictment by the Court of four crimes:
war crimes, crimes against humanity, ge-
nocide and the crime of aggression. The
5 The ICC's budget for 2004 amounts to 53 m euro.
6 The rules and regulations of the ad hoc International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and
Rwanda (ICTR) established under Security Council resolutions are based predominantly on common law
traditions, which is one reason for the high costs involved (approx. US$ 220 m. or roughly 10% of the UN
budget). But there is no doubt that all international criminal proceedings have their price - a price the
international community must be prepared to pay if we want to contribute to post-conflict justice and
thereby create a sound basis for rebuilding societies that in many cases have been shattered by prolonged
conflict and civil war.
7 The Assembly of States Parties will elect a second Deputy Prosecutor at its Third Session in September 2004. 


























definition of the latter is still under di-
scussion – a discussion open to all UN
member states – and is due to be incorpo-
rated into the RS at the review conferen-
ce scheduled for 2009 (Art. 5 (2) RS). 
In many post-conflict environments the
Court will be able to conduct investigations
only in close co-operation with the UN and
its peacekeeping forces, since it has no poli-
ce force of its own and only very limited se-
curity capacities. To facilitate liaison over in-
itiating investigations as well as supporting
them on the ground, there is a clear need, in
the interest of both sides, for a co-operation
agreement with the United Nations8. 
An Agreement on Privileges and Immuni-
ties9, which has been signed by 47 but rati-
fied by only 6 States Parties to date, is equ-
ally essential if the privileges and immuni-
ties contained in Art. 48 RS are to be given
real substance, particularly as regards the
security of investigators and other ICC per-
sonnel engaged in investigating situations
on the ground and interviewing witnesses
and victims. 
8 A draft agreement to this effect was approved by the Assembly of States Parties at its First Session from 3-
10 September 2002 (Res. ICC-ASP/1/3) and is currently being discussed by representatives of the Court
and the UN Secretary-General.
9 Adopted at the First Session of the Assembly of States Parties (Res. PCNICC/2001/1/Add.3) and open for
signature until 30 June 2004.



























Before looking at the Court's main featu-
res in greater detail, it seems worthwhile to
review briefly the history of international
criminal tribunals. At the end of World War
II international criminal tribunals were set
up in Nuremberg and Tokyo to try those re-
sponsible not only for atrocities committed
during the War but also – in the case of the
Nazi leadership – for sending millions of in-
nocent people in Germany and all over Eu-
rope to their deaths because of their race or
convictions. In 1948 the United Nations in-
vited the International Law Commission to
draw up a Draft Code of Crimes against the
Peace and Security of Mankind. The Law
Commission's proposals included a plan for
a permanent international criminal court,
but with the onset of the Cold War the idea
was shelved. 
Shocked by gross human rights violations
in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, rene-
wed calls were heard at the beginning of the
past decade for the international communi-
ty to take action to prevent those responsi-
ble for war crimes, crimes against humani-
ty and genocide going scot-free by invoking
state immunity. On the basis of Security
Council resolutions10, ad hoc Tribunals for
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were set
up in The Hague and Arusha respectively.
They operate under the authority of the Se-
curity Council and their jurisdiction is limi-
ted to a specific region and crimes commit-
ted over a specific period. Their task is to
bring to justice all those responsible for
committing the crimes in question, whe-
ther top leaders or rank and file supporters.
In view of the large number of defendants
and the high costs involved, it is planned
that, in the case of the former Yugoslavia
and as part of the ICTY completion strate-
gy, special chambers of the High Court of
Bosnia and Herzegovina and a special court
in Kosovo should take over some aspects of
the investigations and indictments. 
In a similar development, special courts
have been set up in Eastern Timor, Cambo-
dia (not yet functional) and Sierra Leone.
These so-called „hybrid courts” were esta-
blished by special agreement between the
governments of the countries concerned
and the UN. They apply domestic criminal
law, are staffed by local judges and investi-
gators supported by colleagues from over-
seas and are part-funded by voluntary con-
tributions from the international communi-
ty. Especially the Special Court in Sierra Le-
one seems to have had some success, altho-
ugh Charles Taylor, the main suspect, has
been granted asylum in Nigeria. All these
courts testify to the importance of holding
individuals accountable for crimes they ha-
ve committed. This is crucial not only to en-
sure that those who have suffered can see
justice done but also to prevent entire com-
munities being deemed collectively guilty.
In the long run this will also, it is hoped,
have a deterrent effect on dictators and
other oppressors. 
II .  MAIN FEATURES OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
10 SC Res. 808 (1993) and 955 (1994).



















The ICC, by contrast, is wider in scope. It
is intended to be not a short-lived body but
a permanent court, with universal jurisdic-
tion over a limited number of crimes of the
most serious nature. 
The RS requires that acts constituting the
crime of genocide (Art. 6 RS) must be com-
mitted „with intent to destroy, in whole or
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religio-
us group”. For acts to be deemed crimes
against humanity (Art. 7 RS), the Court
must be satisfied that they were „part of
a widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population, with know-
ledge of the attack”. The Court has jurisdic-
tion in respect of war crimes (Art. 8 RS) „in
particular when committed as part of a plan
or policy or as part of a large-scale commis-
sion of such crimes”. 
3. 
Most importantly, in line with the so-cal-
led „complementarity principle”, the ICC
will exercise its jurisdiction only when the
State in which the crimes in question were
committed is either unwilling or unable (or
both) to genuinely investigate and prosecu-
te them. Under the compromise deal agreed
in Rome, other criteria for jurisdiction ratio-
ne personae are excluded (jurisdiction of
a victim's home state or of the state having
custody of the alleged perpetrator). 
As a permanent court, the ICC creates le-
gal certainty and avoids the difficulties and
expense involved in setting up ad hoc tribu-
nals. This is because: 
it has clear-cut jurisdiction for a limited
number of crimes only and operates con-
sistently under the same set of rules and
regulations, thus ensuring equal treat-
ment of comparable cases; 
prime responsibility for investigations
and indictment rests not with the ICC but
with the State Party concerned, a situ-
ation which has a number of important
advantages: 
= trials take place closer to the scene of
the crime and hence closer to witnesses
and victims; 
= this in turn makes it easier for the pro-
secution and the defence to obtain evi-
dence and call upon witnesses; 
= it avoids witnesses having to spend
long periods in an often alien environ-
ment, which necessitates special support
programmes; 

















= it enhances the efficiency of court pro-
ceedings and makes for lower costs; 
= it makes trials more accessible to the
victims or at least easier for them to fol-
low, which promotes the process of re-
conciliation. This is crucial to heal wo-
unds and bring about lasting peace as
well as an atmosphere conducive to rebu-
ilding community life and repairing da-
mage to infrastructure and property cau-
sed by prolonged periods of instability or
civil war; 
= it gives trials greater credibility (in line
with the maxim „justice must be seen to
be done”). 
If a State Party is willing, yet unable to in-
vestigate and indict (e. g. due to a break-
down of infrastructure and lack of qualified
personnel following a long period of civil
war), prime responsibility still rests, accor-
ding to the complementarity principle, with
the State concerned. It may – as in Sierra
Leone – opt to conduct domestic trials
using „hybrid courts” reinforced by foreign
experts. Should a State Party request such
assistance, the international community
must be prepared to take prompt action to
deploy legal and other personnel where ne-
eded and provide the necessary logistical
and financial support so that trials can take
place within a reasonable period from the
time when the relevant crimes were com-
mitted11. 
Furthermore, in certain post-conflict
environments it might be advisable for the
government in question to refer a
situation12 to the ICC so as to make sure
that investigations and the trials of the 
highest-ranking defendants take place in
The Hague (or elsewhere)13. This may help
avoid civil unrest or the renewed outbreak
of armed conflict when leaders of particular
factions face charges. Less prominent de-
fendants, however, will still have to stand
trial in the State concerned (Art. 17 RS).
Under such circumstances the ICC works
in partnership with the State's domestic co-
urts, which necessitates close collaboration
as well as sensitivity in the exercise of the-
ir respective competences. 
11 As of April 2004 a working group composed of representatives from a number of State Parties, the
European Union and the ICC is examining, with the help of non-governmental organizations with
expertise in this area, the possibility of creating pools for specialized “rapid reaction teams”.
12 Under Art. 13 RS it is not a “case” or specific atrocities committed by a person or persons that are referred
to the ICC but the overall "situation” which has led to such acts. The intention is to avoid developments
in which one side of an internal conflict attempts to use the Court as a vehicle for eliminating or at any
rate incriminating the leadership of the other side. 
13 The ICC organs may sit also outside The Hague (Art. 3 (3) RS).









1. DOES THE ICC AS AN IN-
STITUTION LACK LEGITI-
MACY UNDER PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL 




Kofi Annan has rightly pointed out that
the „ICC is not an organ for political 'witch
hunts' but a 'fortress' against tyranny and
lawlessness which will be guided by inde-
pendence and neutrality”. It has been inspi-
red by the common conviction of most – if
not all – nations that there must be an end
to impunity for international crimes such as
those covered by Arts. 5 to 8 RS. That is
why the US, too, was actively involved in
the process leading up to the aforementio-
ned Diplomatic Conference of 1998 and the
ensuing discussions in the ten successive
sessions of the Preparatory Commission.
The US finally signed the RS, albeit reluc-
tantly14, on the last day it was open for si-
gnature and also the last day of President
Clinton's term of office. The fact that it did
so reflects the leading role played by the US
in setting up the other special tribunals as
well as the values it shares with its partners
in attempting to deal with post-conflict situ-
ations. This is consistent with the logic not
only of US efforts to bring justice to the vic-
tims of horrific crimes but also its strenuous
efforts to contain future conflicts through
a strategy of deterrence, thus preventing
such atrocities from being committed in the
first place. 
As shown above, the RS is based on the
premise that the prime actor in the criminal
prosecution process remains the State in
which the crimes in question occurred or
whose nationals were responsible for their
commission. 
There is no risk of politically motivated
trials. Not only the provisions of the RS
(Art. 15 RS) but also the qualities15 a candi-
date for the office of Prosecutor must 
possess (Art. 42 (3) RS) make it highly unli-
kely that States Parties would elect to this
key post a „frivolous” prosecutor, who could
be manipulated by States potentially hostile
to the US for their own political or other,
non-judicial purposes. Despite such safegu-
ards, it continues to be suggested in some
quarters that a „runaway”, uncontrollable
prosecutor could and would get away with
flagrantly anti-American, unfounded inve-
stigations and prosecutions, and that even an
indictment informed by such motives would
create immense moral and other damage16. 
Moreover, the Prosecutor does not enjoy
complete independence in the way he 
III . THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT – A THREAT 
TO NON-STATE PARTIES? 
14 When agreeing to the signing of the RS, President Clinton made a declaration expressing his doubts and
recommending his successor not to submit it to the Senate for ratification.
15 The candidate must be of high moral character, highly competent and have extensive experience.
16  John Bolton, the US Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, is a strong advocate of
such arguments, which he recently reiterated in a speech at the American Enterprise Institute on 3
November 2003 in Washington, D.C. – cf. http://www.state.gov./t/us/rm/25818.html.

















conducts investigations and prosecutions.
Certain acts such as the issuance of an 
arrest warrant need to be authorized either
by the three-judge Pre-Trial Chamber or at
least by a single judge (Arts. 57 and 58 RS).
Furthermore, the same judges must con-
firm the charges before a trial can go ahead
(Art. 61 RS), whereby their decisions are
again subject to appeal to the five-judge Ap-
peals Chamber (Art. 82 RS). Finally, the
Assembly of States Parties – which can be
convened at any time – has the power to re-
move a Prosecutor from office by simple
majority (Art. 46 RS). Given all these safe-
guards, which to a large extent were incor-
porated into the Statute precisely in order
to allay the fears of the US and a number of
other States concerning the improper use of
the Prosecutor's powers, it is highly unlike-
ly that prosecutions would be initiated for
any such non-judicial purposes. 
2. 
The so-called group of like-minded states
at the Rome Conference (comprising coun-
tries from all over the world, including the
EU Member States, Canada, Australia and
New Zealand, Brazil, Mexico, Argentine,
Korea and many more) were keen to see the
establishment of a court that would be
strong, independent, effective and perma-
nent. Those countries that took a more
sceptical view (spear-headed by the US –
which at the time, however, was still con-
structively engaged in the project – as well
as Russia, China and Arab countries such as
Yemen) preferred to begin with a more
symbolic court that would be subject to the
authority of the UN Security Council. Ano-
ther possible option would have been to re-
quire recognition of the ICC's jurisdiction
on a case-by-case basis ('permanent ad hoc
court'). A third option would have made co-
-operation with the Court subject to the di-
scretion of the State concerned, which wo-
uld have given States virtually unlimited
powers to protect their own nationals and
undermined the whole idea of putting an
end to impunity worldwide. 
In this context it is worth examining
a number of concessions made mostly in
the final stages of the Rome Conference in
order to accommodate key concerns of the
more sceptical countries. These resulted in
the following changes: 
introduction of an opt-out for war cri-
mes valid for a period of seven years
(Art. 124 RS), 
jurisdiction ratione personae was limited
to exclude jurisdiction based on the vic-
tim's home country and the state having
custody over the alleged perpetrator, 


























if a State wishes to genuinely conduct its
own investigations, it can require the Pro-
secutor to refrain from beginning or con-
tinuing investigations (Art. 18 (2) RS), 
definition of 'elements of crimes' as a me-
ans to aid interpretation of the RS; this
concept, which is derived from US milita-
ry law, is designed to limit judges' scope
for interpretation and is alien to both ci-
vil law and common law traditions. 
In this context it seems appropriate to re-
call also two comments made by the head of
the US delegation to the Rome Conference,
Professor David J. Scheffer: 
'Our experience with the establishment
and operation of the International Crimi-
nal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda had convinced us of the
merit creating a permanent court that
could be more quickly available for inve-
stigations and prosecutions and more
cost-efficient in its operations.'17
„At this conference [the Rome Conferen-
ce], the US delegation has engaged in the
most intensive discussions with other
delegations in order to achieve our com-
mon objectives. We sought to find means
to achieve fundamental US requirements
for the court and also the objectives of
other governments. In some instances
our efforts have proven very useful in ar-
riving at constructive language with bro-
ad appeal.' 18
3. IN A DESIRE TO PRO-
TECT THEIR OWN NATIO-
NALS AND TO A CERTAIN
EXTENT EVEN THOSE 
OF THEIR PARTNERS
AND ALLIES, THE US 
HAS TAKEN A VARIETY
OF STEPS: 
It has concluded non-surrender agre-
ements (also known as 'Art. 98 agree-
ments', since they are supposedly based
on Art. 98 (2) RS) with around 70 coun-
tries, some 30 of which are States Parties
to the RS. In most cases such agreements
require the contracting parties, on a reci-
procal basis, not to surrender to the ICC
at its request, without obtaining the
prior consent of the other contracting
party, any of their nationals or even na-
tionals of other countries (military per-
sonnel, active or former government offi-
cials and employees of whatever nationa-
lity) present in their territory. The con-
tracting parties are also required to give
an undertaking that, should an individu-
al be extradited or surrendered to a third
state, they will withhold consent to that
individual's surrender to the ICC. 
In July 2002, in connection with renewal
of the mandate of the UN mission to Bo-
snia and Herzegovina, the US insisted on
the adoption of SC Resolution 1422,
which exempts for a renewable twelve-
month period personnel of NSP (inclu-
ding the US) serving with UN-authori-
zed missions or UN peacekeeping opera-
tions from the jurisdiction of the ICC.
This resolution was justified in terms of
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, indica-
17   115 congress 11 (1998) as cited by Seguin in Boston University Law Journal, Spring 2000 (18 B.U. Int L.J. 85).
18   http://www.state.gov./www/policiy remarks/1998/980715 scheffer icc.html cited as above.


























ting that the ICC was deemed a threat
to international peace and security!
After lengthy dispute the Security Co-
uncil voted unanimously in favour of
the resolution, although a resolution to
renew the exemption tabled in June
2003 met with 3 abstentions from Fran-
ce, Germany and Syria (Res. 1487). 
Although UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan subsequently expressed the ho-
pe that this was the last time such a re-
solution might be considered necessary,
it is not unlikely that the US will ask for
another 'renewal' in 2004. 
The US Congress has furthermore pas-
sed the American Service-members' Pro-
tection Act (ASPA), a bill tabled by Sena-
tor J. Holmes and signed into law by Pre-
sident Bush on 2 August 2002. This Act
requires the Administration to conclude
non-surrender agreements as described
above and do everything in its power to
ensure that Americans will not face trial
before the ICC.19 It also requires the Ad-
ministration to withdraw military aid
from countries unwilling to conclude
such agreements. However, NATO allies
and other partners deemed important to
American interests are exempted or may
be granted presidential waivers. 
While none of these measures directly
impinge on the ICC's jurisdiction, they
do have an indirect impact. Since trials
before the Court require the presence of
the accused (Art. 63 RS), anything that
prevents or renders more difficult the 
apprehension of the accused and his sur-
render to the ICC will impede the work
of the Court. 
The arguments of the USA are based on
the wording of Art. 98 (2) RS, which reads
as follows: 
'The Court may not proceed with a requ-
est for surrender which would require the
requested State to act inconsistently with
its obligations under international agre-
ements pursuant to which the consent of
a sending State is required to surrender
a person of that State to the Court, unless
the Court can first obtain the cooperation
of the sending State for the giving of con-
sent for the surrender'. 
Although the wording of this paragraph is
admittedly somewhat ambiguous, the inten-
tion, it can safely be said, was to cover only
cases where a special agreement with the
US was already in force prior to the entry in-
to force of the RS on 1 July 2002 and their
respective provisions are incompatible. Such
agreements include, for instance, the so-called
'Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA)',
which in certain cases accord the sending
state prime responsibility for investigating
and prosecuting crimes. Under such circum-
stances, it is argued, a State Party should not
be compelled to choose which of the two
agreements (the RS or the SOFA) it will not
comply with. Hence only in this one respect
does the wording of Art. 98 (2) RS limit the
obligation of States Parties to cooperate un-
conditionally with the ICC. It was never me-
ant to allow for new agreements to the same
effect after 1 July 2002. 
This can be clearly deduced by applying
the rules of interpretation as contained in
Arts. 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969. First
of all, Art. 98 RS has to be interpreted in
19 Since the ASPA also permits the use of force to achieve its objectives, it is sometimes referred to in the
Netherlands as the “Hague invasion act”.


























conjunction with the integral Part 9 of the RS
dealing with the obligations of State Parties in
their relations with the ICC. Art. 86 RS requ-
ires the full and unconditional co-operation of
States Parties with the Court; it goes on to
specify a number of well-defined exemptions
which are, however, very limited in scope and
not subject to the discretion of States Parties.
Hence it is clear that the wording of Art. 98
(2) RS must be inter-preted in a way that al-
lows only the narrowest definition of any
exemption from the basic obligation. 
Such agreements must be viewed, fur-
thermore, in the context of Art. 120 RS,
which does not allow any reservations to be
made with respect to the RS. However, any
agreement concluded after the entry into
force of the RS that curtailed a State Party's
obligation to fulfill its commitments under
the RS would indirectly constitute a rese-
rvation with regard to one of the Statute's
key provisions. As such, it would be incom-
patible with both the spirit and the letter of
the RS, since the ICC will only be able to
function properly if States Parties scrupulo-
usly fulfill their obligations to fully co-ope-
rate with the Court. Finally, it should be re-
called that what participants at the Rome
Conference had in mind were exemptions
only for cases where a State Party had conc-
luded a binding agreement prior to the en-
try into force of the RS on 1 July 2002.
Other exceptions or grounds for refusing
co-operation were discussed at length but
ultimately rejected, since any other course
would have jeopardized the Court's ability
to function properly under its own Statute
and hence its entire raison d˘tre. 
4.
With a view to safeguarding the integrity
of the RS and the viability of the ICC, the
Council of the European Union adopted on
11 June 2001 a Common Position, which
was amended on 20 June 200220. In Art.
2 (2) of the latest version adopted on 15 Ju-
ne 200321, EU Member States undertake to
'contribute to the worldwide participation
in and implementation of the Statute also
by other means'. This should be read in con-
junction with paragraph 10 of the Preamble
stating: 'It is eminently important that the
integrity of the Rome Statute be preserved.
'Since these decisions form part of the 'EU
acquis', they are binding on the accession
countries as well. This aspect was highligh-
ted also in the Council Conclusions of 30
September 200222: 
'The Council confirms that the European
Union is firmly committed by the EU Com-
mon position to support the early establish-
ment and effective functioning of the Inter-
national Criminal Court and to preserve the
full integrity of the Rome Statute.'
Furthermore, the Council expresses the
hope that the US will continue to work to-
gether with its allies and partners in develo-
ping effective and impartial international
criminal justice. To this end it proposes
a broader dialogue between the EU and the
US on all matters relating to the ICC, un-
derlining in particular: 
The desirability of the US re-engaging in
the ICC process (the US is entitled to be
20 A "Common Position“ is one of the instruments of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as provided
for in Arts. 12 and 15 of the Treaty on European Union. Art. 15 (2) of the Treaty provides that Member
States shall ensure that their national policies conform with such common positions. This means that a
Common Position is of a more formalized nature than mere Council conclusions. 
21 Council Common Position 2003/444/CFSP, Official Journal of the European Union L 150/67 of
18.06.2003.
22 2450th Council meeting in Brussels on 30 September 2002.

















an observer to the Assembly of States
Parties). 
The development of a relationship enta-
iling practical co-operation between the
US and the Court in specific cases. 
It is to be hoped that the dialogue will be
resumed at an early date so as to avoid fur-
ther friction within the transatlantic com-
munity and, by reaffirming partners' shared
values, pave the way for renewed 'good ne-
ighbourliness' in ICC matters. 
5. 
A final postscript to round off the argu-
ment: any move by Germany – an entirely
hypothetical case23 – to conclude a non-sur-
render agreement would be in breach of the
German ICC Act (Cooperation Act), which
stipulates a duty to surrender suspects at
the request of the Court (Section 2 (1) and
(2) of the ICC Act). Such an agreement wo-
uld be possible only after parliamentary ap-
proval of an amendment to the ICC Act,
a step which by its very nature would result
in the German legislature contravening its
international obligations under the RS. 
23 As has been pointed out (cf. 10), under the terms of ASPA Germany as an NATO ally is exempted from the
requirement to conclude such agreements.
